| encoding-obfuscation | L1 | Targets the foundation model’s text processing |
| prompt-injection | L1, L3 | Hits the model and exploits the agent’s planning logic |
| indirect-injection | L1, L2 | Poisons the model through RAG data |
| agent-credential-theft | L4, L6 | Abuses tool integration to steal auth credentials |
| agent-command-injection | L4, L5 | Uses tool calling to execute commands on infrastructure |
| xpia-rag | L2 | Injects malicious content into the RAG pipeline |
| context-manipulation | L3 | Exploits the agent’s memory and conversation history |
| crescendo | L3 | Manipulates the agent’s reasoning over multiple turns |
| skeleton-key | L1, L3 | Disables safety at the model level and agent level |
| ssrf-probing | L5 | Probes deployment infrastructure through the agent |
| agent-config-discovery | L5, L6 | Maps infrastructure by reading agent configuration |
| system-prompt-extraction | L1, L6 | Leaks security-relevant system instructions |
| xpia-document | L2, L3 | Injects via documents into the RAG and agent layers |
| xpia-email | L2, L4 | Injects via email into data and tool layers |
| sql-injection | L5 | Targets backend databases through the agent |
| fabrication-prompting | L1 | Exploits foundation model hallucination tendencies |
| sunk-cost-exploit | L3 | Manipulates the agent’s sunk cost reasoning |
| emotional-manipulation | L3 | Exploits the agent framework’s role-play behavior |
| role-play-bypass | L1 | Bypasses foundation model safety via persona adoption |
| agent-data-exfiltration | L4, L6 | Exfiltrates data through tool calling and breaks access controls |