memory-injection · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Injects fabricated memories or prior conversation history to make the model believe it already agreed to produce harmful contentRun it:system-prompt-override · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Attempts to replace or nullify the system prompt mid-conversation using injected meta-instructionsRun it:attention-diversion · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Buries harmful requests inside long distracting content to divert model attention from safety-relevant portionsRun it:context-fragmentation · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Spreads a harmful request across multiple messages so no single turn triggers safety filters, then synthesizes the fragmentsRun it:context-poisoning · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Poisons the conversation context with misleading facts, false authority claims, or fabricated precedents before making the harmful requestRun it:context-window-overflow · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Floods the context window with benign filler text to push safety instructions out of the model’s effective attention spanRun it:conversation-hijacking · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Hijacks an ongoing benign conversation by injecting a new harmful objective and claiming it is the real purpose of the sessionRun it:false-consensus · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Claims prior agreement to harmful actions across conversation turns, using social pressure and fabricated consensus to override model judgmentRun it:history-rewriting · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Claims previous turns said something different than they did, attempting to rewrite conversation history to shift model behaviorRun it:instruction-layering · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Stacks contradictory instructions at different priority levels to create ambiguity that the model resolves in favor of the attackerRun it:persona-persistence · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Establishes a permissive persona early in conversation then exploits it across turns to extract harmful contentRun it:semantic-drift · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Gradually shifts the meaning of key terms across conversation turns until harmful content falls under a redefined benign labelRun it:state-confusion · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Confuses the model about its current conversation state by presenting contradictory or ambiguous context signalsRun it:temporal-confusion · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Confuses the model about time and sequence of events to make it believe restrictions were introduced later or have expiredRun it:token-budget-exhaustion · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Exhausts the model’s output token budget with benign content before the harmful request, hoping reduced budget degrades safety checkingRun it: