cialdini-authority · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Invokes authority figures, credentials, or institutional power to override safety guidelinesRun it:cialdini-commitment · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Extracts small commitments progressively, using consistency pressure to escalate toward a harmful final requestRun it:cialdini-reciprocity · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Uses Cialdini’s reciprocity principle to create a sense of obligation before making a harmful requestRun it:cognitive-load · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Overwhelms the model with a flood of complex information, instructions, and context to slip a harmful request past safety reasoningRun it:fear-appeal · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Uses fear, threat, or danger framing to coerce the model into complying by framing refusal as catastrophicRun it:foot-in-door · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Starts with small, benign requests and gradually escalates to harmful ones, exploiting consistency biasRun it:guilt-manipulation · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Induces guilt and moral responsibility to override refusals by framing non-compliance as harmful or cruelRun it:learned-helplessness · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Repeatedly asserts that the model has no choice but to comply, attempting to erode resistance through attritionRun it:moral-disengagement · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Reframes harmful actions as morally justified through euphemism, diffusion of responsibility, or dehumanization of victimsRun it:anchoring-manipulation · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Sets an extreme reference point to make a harmful request appear moderate or reasonable by comparisonRun it:bandwagon-pressure · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Applies social pressure through claims that widespread adoption or consensus makes the request acceptableRun it:cialdini-liking · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Builds rapport and flattery over multiple turns to lower defenses before making a harmful requestRun it:cialdini-scarcity · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Uses scarcity and urgency framing to pressure the model into complying before it can fully reason about safetyRun it:cialdini-social-proof · single-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Claims that other AI models, users, or authorities have already complied to normalize the harmful requestRun it:door-in-face · multi-turn · OWASP: LLM01 · MITRE: AML.T0054, AML.T0068Makes an extreme request first, then follows with a ‘smaller’ harmful request that seems reasonable by comparisonRun it: